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STUDENT NOTES
STATUTORY REMEDIES-THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
IN WEST VIRGINIA

The declaratory judgment is a relatively new remedy in West
Virginia, in that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Acts was enacted in 1941.' Similar to the federal act,2 the West Virginia enactment provides that:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative
in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final decree.
A companion provision provides for further relief:
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdition to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any
adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the
declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why the
further relief should not be granted.3
The foregoing provisions are quite comprehensive in scope.
While the former provision expressly sets forth the power to adjudicate and declare the petitioner's rights, the latter provision grants
wide discretion to a court to enforce or supplement its previous
decree. The two sections have been construed to require two separate
proceedings. In Tharp v. Tharp,4 the court, citing West Virginia' W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 1 et seq. (Michie 1966). It had been
earlier proposed that the declaratory judgment remedy be adopted as a
procedural rule promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The
suggestion was tendered to that body by the Judicial Council, but the
Supreme Court of Appeals refused to act upon the request, stating that the
procedure should be instituted by the legislature. Jackson, A Note on
Judgment Pleading and Practice, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 130 (1942).
Declaratory
2
THE FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Acr, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02

(1964), is the federal counterpart of West Virginia Act. The Federal Act is
substantially identical to the West Virginia Act with the notable exception
that disputes arising from federal tax obligations are not covered by the
Act.
Federal
3
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966).
4 131 W. Va. 529, 48 S.E.2d 793 (1948). This case involved the construction of a will. The testator devised all of his real estate and personal
property to his surviving son with a life estate reserved in the testator's
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STUDENT NOTES
at this time, and was also the father of a son, Eugene. The will provided
5

PittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong, stated that "this court recognized the
difference between simple adjudicating 'rights, status and other legal
relations' and the granting of relief, . . . providing expressly that
relief may be sought by petition following declaratory judgment."6
However, Rule 57 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in part:

A party may demand declaratory relief or coercive relief
or both in one action. Furtherrelief baied on a declaratory

judgment may be granted in the declaratoryaction or upon
petition to any court in which the declaratory action might
have been instituted.'
widow. The surviving son, Earl M. Tharp, was married to Elwilda Tharp
that should the widow remarry or die the whole of the real and personal
property should become the absolute property of Earl M. Tharp and his
children. Eugene, the only child of Earl M. Tharp, died before the death
or remarriage of his paternal grandmother. Elwilda Tharp, plaintiff, asserted
that at the testator's death her estranged husband, Earl, and their son Eugene,
took a joint vested remainder in the testator's estate. Plaintiff further asserted
that upon the death of her son Eugene, she and her husband, under the laws
of descent and distribution, took a joint one-half vested remainder in their
son's estate. Plaintiff accordingly sought a declaratory judgment to ascertain
her rights under the will and prayed for payment out of the testators estate
under a separation settlement between plaintiff and her husband, appointment
of a receiver for the testators estate, and reference of the cause to a commissioner in chancery.
The court held that plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory judgment and
agreed that plaintiff was entitled to a share of the testator's estate based upon
her deceased son's estate. The court, however, held that the plaintiff was
merely entitled to a declaration of her rights and the further relief requested
could not be granted in a declaratory proceeding, but must be requested by
petition after declaration of her rights.
5.129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947). In this case, which involved
a declaration of rights under a deed pertaining to ownership of coal rights,
the court, speaking to the plaintiff's combination of a specific prayer for
relief with declarative relief, stated:
We believe it is quite clear that the bill of complaint is demurrable
to the extent that it combines a prayer for an adjudication of rights
with a prayer for specific relief. Under the terms of the act the
latter can be granted only to the extent that it is justified by a subsequent separate petition. Id. at 835, 42 S.E.2d at 48-9 (emphasis
added).
6
Tharp v. Tharp, 131 W. Va. 529, 539, 48 S.E.2d 793, 799 (1948)
(emphasis added).
7 M. Lugar & L. Silverstein, W. VA. RuLEs 443 (1960) (emphasis added).
In a note following Rule 57 the reporter stated that the material quoted
would change the present law. Id. The intent of the Rules was to change
many basic judicial procedures that appear in the W. Va. Code as statutory
rules of court. W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 1, § 4 (Michie 1966) provides, in
part:
The supreme court of appeals may, from time to time, make and
promulgate general rules and regulations governing pleading, practice
and procedure in such court and in all other courts of record in this
State. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure shall
have force and effect only as rules of court and shall remain in effect
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It appears therefore that declaratory and coercive relief may both
be obtained in the original proceeding without the need of petitioning the court for further relief or enforcement of its previous decree.
Understanding the purpose behind the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act enables one to better understand its value as a remedy.
Judge Kenna, in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong,8
pointed out that the design of the act was "to anticipate the actual
accrual of causes for equitable relief or rights of action, by anticipa-

tory orders which adjudicate real controversies before violation or
breach results in loss to one or the other of the persons involved .
•.." One leading author expressed the purpose of the declaratory

judgment as follows:
[T]o make disputes as to rights, or titles, justiciable without proof of a wrong committed by one party against the
other, and to afford a remedy, speedy and inexpensive in
character, whereby the legal duties, rights, and liabilities
may be adjudicated before wrongs have actually been
committed or damages have been suffered, and with this
in view, the statute and the remedy afforded thereby should
be liberally construed and freely applied, and in the end
resulting in relief from insecurity and uncertainty with
respect to rights, status, liabilities, and other legal relations."

Although liberal construction of the declaratory judgment is contemplated," an action for declaratory relief is properly sought only
in certain instances.
unless and until modified, suspended or annulled by rules promul-

gated pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Since the procedural provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
antedate the W. Va. Rules, the provisions of the latter will prevail over the
former.
Rule 57 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure also provides
that in a proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the right
to trial by jury may be demanded pursuant to Rules 38 and 39. If, however,
the pleadings or proof disclose no issue other than the establishment of a
party's personal status, or other legal relation, a jury trial may be properly
refused. E.g., Watterman v. Taylor, 168 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1948).
8 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
901d. at 835, 42 S.E.2d at 48.
' W. ANDERsoN, DECLARATORY JuDGmENTs 4-5 (1st ed. 1951).
" W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 12 (Michie 1966) provides:
This article is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status and other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and
administered. (emphasis added).
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WHEN THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CAN BE USED

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides imaginative
methods of serving clients. The Act expressly provides for construc-

don of contracts before or after breach,' 2 declarations concerning
trusts and estates,' 3 and the validity of statutes, ordinances, or franchises. 4 The Act does not restrict itself to those matters alone;
Section 5 provides that despite the enumeration in the Act of specific

instances when the remedy may be used no specific limitations are
intended. For example, in Lake v. Potomac Light and Power Co.,'
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to determine if defendant's
electrical equipment was trespassing on plaintiff's property. In a
more recent case, the Circuit Court of Cabell County was asked to
render a declaratory judgment to determine the official duties of the

county clerk.' 6
12 W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 3 (Michie 1966) provides: "A contract
may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof."
13 W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 4 (Michie 1966) states:
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir,
next of kin or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or
of the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent, may have
a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto:
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs,
next of kin or others, or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or
abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the
estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and
other writings.
14W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 11 (Michie 1966) provides in part:
In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and
shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the State
shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to
be heard.
In Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969), plaintiffs
brought declaratory judgment actions contesting the constitutionality of
certain West Virginia statutes. The court stated that the declaratory
judgment actions were proper proceedings by which to determine the rights
of the parties. Id. at 786.
1 150 W. Va. 641, 149 S.E.2d 230 (1966). In this case the Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's summary judgment
favoring the defendant on the basis that there was a genuine controversy.
The court further held that plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial of the issues
in controversy.
16Arthur v. County Court of Cabell County, 167 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va.
1969). Plaintiff county clerk in this case instituted a declaratory judgment
action for the purpose of determining whether plaintiff was entitled to
receive reasonable compensation in addition to his regular salary for preparation of the County's annual financial statement. The trial court held for
plaintiff but the Court of Appeals reversed. The controversy centered upon

a 1967 amendment to the W. Va. Code which authorized the county court
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Other jurisdictions have made wide use of the declarative remedy. It has been used to ascertain whether a particular grievance
arising under a written contract is properly subject to arbitration
under the agreement,17 to determine the boundary lines of a school
district," to ascertain whether the right to redeem property sold at
a judicial sale exists,' 9 to determine the identity of a judgment
debtor,2" to secure a widow's right to Social Security benefits," and
to ascertain whether a tree overhanging a property line was a nuisance. 2 These are but a few of the instances where the declarative
remedy may be used. In short, the declarative judgment may be
utilized in nearly every conceivable type of justiciable controversy.
AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY

Although the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not
expressly require a justiciable controversy," case law in West Virginia is solidly behind the requirement of a clashing of adverse interests. "Adverseness" has been defined as a claim of legal rights
asserted by one party and denied by the other.'4 Unless such adverseness is present a court will not take jurisdiction of the matter.
to employ the county clerk to assist the county court to perform its required
duty of preparing the annual county financial statement. Prior to the
amendment, the Code provided that the county clerk shall prepare the report
for the county court. The apparent effect of the 1967 amendment was to
place the duty of preparing the report upon the county court instead of the
county clerk. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that this was a narrow
view of the legislative intent and pointed out that the Code has long provided
that the clerk is to perform such functions for the county court. Moreover,
the Court observed that the means of preparing the financial statement were
in the exclusive possession of the clerk and if the legislative intent was as the
plaintiff contended then the legislature would have made specific provision
to supply the means by which the county court could have performed that
duty. 7
Harvey Machinery Co. v. Alvarey, 76 Cal. App. 2d 427, 173 P.2d
65 (1946).
"8Dean v. Board of Educ., 247 Ky. 553, 57 S.W.2d 477 (1933).
19 Klein v. Morgan, 301 Ill. App. 203, 22 N.E.2d 269 (1939).
20 Naftel Dry Goods Co. v. Mitchell, 212 Ala. 31, 101 So. 653 (1924).
21 Lamay v. Hobby, 132 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
22 Bonde v. Bishop, 112 Cal. App. 2d 1, 245 P.2d 617 (1952).
"3Tim FEDERAL D cLARATORY JUDGmENT AcT, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964)
is much more explicit in requiring a justiciable controversy. In pertinent part
the federal act declares:
In the case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court
of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party .... (emphasis added.)
24 Mainella v. Board of Trustees, 126 W. Va. 183, 186, 27 S.E.2d 486,
488 (1943).
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In South Charleston v. Board of Education,5 the city was
negotiating with the federal government for the purchase of land.
The city sought a declaratory judgment to declare a contract between
it and the Board of Education null and void. The contract in question provided for the city to lease land to the Board of Education
should the city acquire the property from the federal government.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the lower court which had granted relief to the plaintiff. Judge
Lovins, speaking for the Court, stated that a justiciable controversy
did not exist between plaintiff and defendant because South Charleston had no actual interest in the land. The United States Government, not South Charleston, was still the owner of the land and was
not a party to the action. The mere fact that the plaintiff was contemplating a conveyance from the United States Government did not
give South Charleston standing to seek the declaratory relief. The
court stated that "a declaration of rights will not be based on a
future contingency." 6
Although the South Charleston case made it quite plain that
declaratory relief could not be predicated on a future contingency,
in Farley v. Graney 7 the court narrowed this prohibition. Here the
court considered an application for declarative relief in a constitutional challenge of a newly enacted state statute concerning the
operation of junk yards. The statute, adopted by the legislature on
June 11, 1959, was not to become enforceable until July 1, 1960,
three months after plaintiff brought suit. Although plaintiff, the
operator of a junk yard, would not have been in violation of the
statute until its enforcement date, the court found the action to
involve an actual controversy, not a future contingency. The court
stated:
It would not be consonant with the spirit, intent and purpose of the declaratory judgment statutes to have required
the plaintiff to wait until [the] July 1, 1960 deadline, then
to violate the statute and to be arrested in order to have
a determination of his rights, duties, and responsibilities
under the statute. Only in a limited sense can it be said that
the plaintiff has sought herein a declaratory judgment
before the statute became effective. Only the enforcement
132 W. Va. 77, 50 S.E.2d 880 (1948).
1d. at 84, 50 S.E.2d at 883.
27 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
25

26

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss2/6

6

Palmer: Statutory Remedies--The Declaratory Judgment in West Virginia
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

provisions were in abeyance at the time this proceding was
commenced.2 8
In Crank v. McLaughlin,29 a suit to obtain declaratory relief
from a state agency regulation, the actual controversy requirement

was again the primary issue. The dispute arose over a regulation of
the defendant State Commissioner of Agriculture which abrogated
certain parts of a milk regulation ordinance enacted by the City of
Charleston. The plaintiff, a milk handler, sought a declaratory judgment testing the legality of the defendant's action. Judge Fox, speaking for the court, stated that plaintiff did not have the necessary
standing to bring the action because a relationship or status did not
exist between the parties that would entitle a court of competent
jurisdiction to grant relief. The court stated:
No one has a vested right in any law or ordinance, in the
sense that a continuance thereof may be demanded, although rights accruing thereunder are always protected up
to the time of any repeal or modification thereof. The
plaintiffs would not have had any right to complain had
the city, through action of its proper authorities, adopted
an ordinance which would have carried out to the letter
the provisions of the regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Agriculture."0
Therefore, the plaintiff milk handler, lacking standing to bring the
action, failed to present the justiciable controversy requisite to declaratory relief.
The purpose behind the requirement of an actual controversy
in an action for declarative relief is the court's long standing refusal
to render advisory opinions or to resolve academic disputes."1 In the
final analysis, whether a justiciable controversy exists will depend
upon the facts of the case at the time the proceeding is commenced. 2
28 Id. Among those cases cited granting declarative relief prior to the
effective date of a statute were: Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1924); Hoagland v. Bibb, 12 Ill. App. 2d 298, 139 N.E.2d 417 (1957).
'9 125 W. Va. 126, 23 S.E.2d 56 (1942).
30 Id. at 131, 23 S.E.2d 59.
a' Maniella v. Board of Trustees, 126 W. Va. 183, 185, 27 S.E.2d 486,
488 (1943).
32
E.g., Robertson v. Hatcher, 148 W. Va. 239, 247, 135 S.E.2d 675, 681
(1964). This case involved a declaratory judgment proceeding contesting the
constitutionality of an apportionment statute. The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of a Legislative act which apportioned the state into Congressional and Senatorial Districts and which gave every county within the
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NECESSITY OF COMPLETE RESOLUTION

The West Virginia Code precludes the use of the declaratory
judgment "where such judgment or decree, if rendered and entered,
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the

proceeding. 3
The problem of an inadequate remedy often arises where a
necessary party to the action is not joined, resulting in the court's
inability to properly define the rights and liabilities of the parties.
In Mainella v. Board of Trustees 4 declaratory relief granted by the
lower court was held ineffective because all of the necessary parties

were not before the court. Since the justiciable controversy could
not be settled, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions.
In holding that a controversy in question could be finally resolved by a declaratory judgment of the rights of plaintiff under a
will, the court in Tharp v. Tharp observed that such a "suit will
remove the uncertainty involved here, and will serve to bring to a
speedy termination the matters in controversy between plaintiff and
defendant.""5 It is clear that unless the requested judgment is capable
state at least one seat in the House of Delegates. In apportioning the state
into Senatorial Districts the Legislature "superimposed" the Seventeenth
Senatorial District over the Eighth Senatorial District in order to give
Kanawha County an additional two state senators. Among other defenses,
the defendants contended "that an actual controversy did not exist at the
time the action was instituted as no legal right had been claimed by the
plaintiffs and denied by the defendants." Id. at 246. The Supreme Court of
Appeals disposed of this contention by pointing out that although the plaintiff
had not yet been denied a legal right, the Legislative act in issue had indeed
been enacted prior to the institution of the plaintiffs action and therefor posed
adverseness to the plaintiff's interests. Hence, at the time the action was
instituted
the facts indicated that a justiciable controversy did in fact exist.
33
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 6 (Michie 1966).
34 126 W. Va. 183, 27 S.E.2d 486 (1943). In this case plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment against the Board of Trustees of the Policemen's
Pension and Relief Fund of the City of Fairmont. The action concerned the
Board's refusal to continue payment of a pension to plaintiff, disabled
policeman. The defendant appealed an adverse judgment and the Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the lower court with
directions. While holding that a declaratory judgment was otherwise appropriate, the Court held that the merits of the cause could not be fully and
completely adjudicated without the joinder of the City and the Mayor as codefendants. The judgment for plaintiff rendered in the lower court was
therefore defective and ineffective. Moreover, W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 13,
§ 11 (Michie 1966) provides:
When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which could be affected by the
declaration and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons
not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the
validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise such municipality shall
be
made a party and shall be entitled to be heard....
35
Tharp v. Tharp, 131 W. Va. 529, 533, 48 S.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1948).
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of resolving the controversy, the relief will be inappropriate and
therefore denied.' 6
JURISDICTION

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not, and was not
intended to enlarge a court's jurisdiction.17 Before it has been
determined that a justiciable controversy exists, it is necessary to
determine if the other jurisdictional requirements are present in order
that declarative relief may be granted. An intial jurisdictional inquiry
relates to the parties to the action. All necessary parties to the action
must be joined before the court can render an effective decree."8
Similarly, a court must have jurisdiction over the ies when an in rem
declaratory judgment is sought. In short, to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement, the controversy between the parties to the action "must
be of such nature as would warrant a court of law or equity in taking
39
jurisdiction, if the same were asserted in some other proceeding.'
CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the declaratory judgment remedy has been
available in West Virginia for nearly thrity years, an examination of

the cases of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discloses
that it is not often employed. The advantages of the act dictate a
more frequent utilization of the remedy. Foremost among the advantages are savings of time and expenses. Another advantage of
the declarative remedy is the opportunity to secure preventive
relief against a threatened breach of duty. Since the legislature intended liberal construction of the act, wide utilization was contemplated. The declaratory judgment remedy is a valuable and worthwhile procedural tool. With more frequent use, the declarative
remedy should prove to be, as indeed it is, a short-cut to the better
administration of justice.
David L. Parmer
W. VA.CODE ch. 55, art. 13, § 6 (Michie 1966).
Dolan v. Hardman, 126 W. Va. 480, 484, 29 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1944):
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not confer on courts of this
State new jurisdiction nor extend jurisdiction in existence prior to its enactment, unless it can be said that authority to grant declaratory relief instead of
coercive relief is an extension of jurisdiction.
38 E.g., Mainella v. Board of Trustees, 126 W. Va. 183, 27 S.E.2d 486
(1943); South Charleston v. Board of Educ., 132 W. Va. 77, 50 S.E.2d 880
(1948).
39 Crank v. McLaughlin, 125 W. Va. 126, 131, 23 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1942).
36
1
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